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The general security goals of a computer system 
are  known  to  include  confidentiality,  integrity  and 
availability  (C-I-A)  which  prevent  critical  assets 
from potential threats. The C-I-A security goals are 
well  researched  areas;  however  they  may  be 
insufficient to address all the needs of the summative 
e-assessment. In this paper, we do not discard the 
fundamental C-I-A security goals; rather we define 
security  goals  which  are  specific  to  summative  e-




Online summative assessment is a powerful tool 
which  embodies  great  benefits  such  as  automated 
marking, immediate feedback and on-demand tests. 
Online  summative  assessments  are  categorised  as 
high-stake examinations which count towards a final 
course  mark.  In  higher  education,  summative  e-
assessments  can  be  divided  into  two:  (1)  e-
assessments in supervised environments and (2) e-
assessments  in  non-supervised  environments. 
Summative  e-assessments  which  are  conducted  in 
supervised  environments  include  campus  based 
exams  and  authorised  test  centres  [18].  In  these 
environments, authorised personnel or proctors’ are 
required  to  monitor  and supervise  the  examination 
process  from  start  to  finish.    Non-supervised 
environments include distance learning examinations 
and  on-demand  tests.  In  these  environments,  the 
examination  process  may  be  supervised  remotely; 
however  the  examinee  is  required  to  maintain 
academic  honesty.  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on 
summative  e-assessments  conducted  in 
supervised/controlled conditions and do not assume a 
non-supervised environment.  
According to Furnell [3], education is not a sector 
in  which  security  considerations  feature;  however 
this  changes  when  an  online  assessment  is 
considered.  Thus,  for  the  purpose  of  conducting 
secured summative e-assessment, it is important to 
define  specific  security  components  such  as 
requirements,  assets,  threats,  models,  frameworks 
and  goals. In their work,  Marais [11] identify two 
categories of security in e-assessments:  web security 
and e-assessment security. However, they concluded 
that web security is a well investigated area but it is 
insufficient  to  fulfil  the  security  needs  of  e-
assessment.  In  addition  to  the  well  defined  web 
security areas, we include that data security [8] and 
the  network  security  [18]  of  summative  e-
assessments are also well researched. However, we 
suggest  that  the  user  security  phase  of  the  e-
assessment security is a continuing research field. In 
this paper, our aim is to present the security goals 
specific to user security in e-assessments.  
 
2. Assets, Threats and Security Goals  
In this section, we define the concepts of assets, 
threats  and  security  goals  in  accordance  with 
definitions from security engineering.  
2.1. Definitions 
 
An  asset  refers  to  a  resource  that  might  have 
value, which may be either tangible or intangible that 
needs to be protected from harm [9].  Types of asset 
controlled by a system include money, information 
and data. Identifying the relevant assets of a system 
can  prevent  harm  to  the  assets  if  the  system  is 
misused [12]. A threat is the potential for misuse or 
abuse of an asset that will cause harm in the context 
of the system [7]. The level of harm that can occur 
depends on the asset type. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to identify the relevant threats that may apply to each 
asset  type.  A  goal  is  something  people  interpret 
differently depending on the nature of job they are 
doing. For example, a goal would mean differently to 
a footballer, psychologist or an engineer. In general, 
a goal expresses what is desired. It can also refer to a 
specific, measureable occurrence that any business or 
system  plans  or  intends  to  achieve  or  avoid.  One 
method of generating the security goals of a system 
is by specifying that the actions on the assets listed in 
threat descriptions can be prevented [8].  
2.2.  Confidentiality,  Integrity  and 
Availability 
 
The  hardware,  software  and  data  of  computer 
systems  are  widely  recognised  as  valuable  assets 
[15].  In  computer  network  systems,  the  network 
medium  is  also  regarded  as  a  critical  asset.    The 
security  goals  which  ensure  that  the  hardware, 
software  and  data  assets  are  not  compromised include  confidentiality  (C),  integrity  (I)  and 
availability (A) [5]. In literature, it is suggested that a 
security  relationship  exists  between  the  C-I-A 
security  goals  and  the  critical  assets  (hardware, 
software  and  data)  of  a  system  [15].    Thus,  a 
compromise in the C-I-A security goals may lead to 
a compromise of the critical assets. To explain the 
existing security relationship, we present an example 
of data stored in a computer. The data is expected: 
•  To be accessed by only authorised parties; 
thus,  data  must  be  restricted 
(confidentiality). 
•  To  contain  no  alterations  of  the  original 
data;  modification  should  be  done  by 
authorised parties only (integrity). 
•  To be operational and accessible whenever 
it  is  needed;  except  during  authorised 
downtimes (availability). 
As described in [13], the threat of unauthorised 
exposure is converted to the goal of protection from 
unauthorised  exposure,  commonly  known  as 
confidentiality. Similarly, the threat of unauthorised 
alteration is converted to the goal of integrity. Using 
a similar approach, the C-I-A security goals can be 
applied to summative e-assessment data (e.g. items 
stored  in  the  item  bank)  to  prevent  data  from 
potential threats. In addition, the C-I-A security goals 
may be applied to protect the hardware (server) and 
software  (application)  needs  of  a  summative  e-
assessment system.  
3.  E-assessment  Assets,  Threats  and 
Security Goals  
In this paper, we propose that the valuable assets 
of a summative e-assessment system extend beyond 
the hardware, software and data needs. It should be 
noted that, we do not discard the importance of the 
above  assets;  rather  we  present  assets  which  are 
specific  to  the  e-assessment  system.  Online 
summative assessments are regarded as tests which 
are  taken  to  produce  a  feedback  of  teaching  and 
learning.  A  lecturer  sets  a  test  based  on  his/her 
course  materials,  and  the  student  is  required  to 
answer the questions. Since summative assessments 
count towards a student final mark; then a student 
will do all to pass. Based on the definition of an asset 
(see section 2.1), we propose that a student taking a 
test  is  a  valuable  asset  to  the  summative  e-
assessment system. In addition, an online assessment 
system  is  perceived  busy,  when  it  is  providing  an 
online test for a student.  
A security threat launched on a system may cause 
potential harm to the critical assets. Security threats 
may be a deliberate or non-deliberate act [19]. Thus, 
we  describe  three  types  of  possible  harm  which  a 
student (asset) may deliberately put in effect:  
•  T1:  Incorrect  and  illegal  student  taking  a 
test 
•  T2: Falsification of identity detail 
•  T3: Abuse of authenticity detail 
Having  identified  the  asset  and  the  potential 
threats  of  a  summative  e-assessment  system,  we 
propose  that  the  C-I-A  security  goals  may  be 
unsuitable to prevent the asset from the threats. As 
depicted in section 2.2, the C-I-A security goals are 
better  suited  for  assets  which  are  not  directly 
dependent on humans. It is observed that during an 
online test a student is required to interact with the 
machine (hardware asset). Thus, the C-I-A security 
goals can be applied to the machine; however, the 
student is unable to satisfy the C-I-A security goals 
independently. Furthermore, it is practically unlikely 
to  determine  if  a  student  taking  an  online  test 
satisfies the C-I-A security goals. Hence, we propose 
three  security  goals  to  be  satisfied  by  the  student 
taking an online assessment.  It should be noted that 
we do not disregard existence of the C-I-A security 
goals; however we define security goals specific to 
user security:  
•  SG1:  Prevent  incorrect  and  illegal  student 
taking a test. This is described as the goal of 
Presence. 
•  SG2: Prevent falsification of identity detail. 
This is described as the goal of Identity. 
•  SG3:  Prevent  abuse  of  authenticity  detail. 
This  is  described  as  the  goal  of 
Authentication.  
Table  1.  Security  goals  and  related 
questions 
Security Goals  Security Questions 
Presence  Are you there? 
Identity  Who are you? 
Authentication  Is it really you? 
 
4.  Identity  and  Authentication  Security 
Goals  
The identity and authentication security goals are 
existing goals needed to fulfil the user security phase 
of an online assessment. During a summative test, a 
student is required to provide answers to the “who 
are you?” and “is it really you?” questions (see table 
1). Security research in summative e-assessment has 
concentrated  on  developing  secure  mechanisms  to 
assists  students  in  providing  and  proving  this 
answers. The username and password technique is a 
widely  acceptable  method  to  confirm  student 
legitimacy. Another method is the use of biometrics, which  is  suggested  as  an  ultimate  identity  and 
authentication  technique  for  e-learning  [11]. 
Irrespective  of  known  biometric challenges  [2,  10, 
17],  researchers  explore  the  possibilities  of 
employing  biometrics  in  e-assessment.  Current 
researches  focus  on  multi-biometrics  to  support 
services for identity and authentication [3, 16].  
Regardless  of  the  techniques  employed,  the 
identity  and  authentication  of  a  student  remains  a 
major  challenge  to  the  summative  e-assessment 
process  [1,  8].  Hence,  we  do  not  suggest  the 
unsuitability  of  the  mechanisms  used;  rather  we 
propose  that  satisfying  the  identity  and 
authentication  goals  alone  is  insufficient  to  ensure 
user  security.  It  is  reminded,  that  this  paper  is 
focused  on  e-assessments  within  a  supervised 
environment  and  not  a  remote  distance  learning 
environment.  Thus,  the  example  and  scenarios 
presented  relate  to  the  activities  in  a  controlled 
environment.    The  example  is  identified  through 
sources  such  as  interviews  with  e-assessment 
officers,  personal  e-assessment  experiences  and 
complimented  with  literature  review  to  provide  a 
balance. The relevant excerpts are described in the 
example below. 
4.1. Summative E-assessment Example  
 
 We  assume  that,  COMP101  is  a  compulsory 
undergraduate  module  in  a  Computer  Science 
department.  During  online  summative  assessments, 
students  are  required  to  enter  their  identity  and 
authentication details to verify their legitimacy. The 
student will proceed in the assessment if there is an 
exact match with the stored details; however, if there 
is no match the student will retry. During the test, an 
authenticated student may carry out any (or none) of 
these  actions:  (1)  need  the  toilet;  thus  leaving  the 
exam room, (2) finish the exam early and (3) feel 
sick. Based on the above example, we describe two 
scenarios 
1.  We assume that Alice is registered for the 
COMP101  course.  However,  on  the  exam 
day  Alicia  shows  up  to  represent  Alice. 
Alicia  enters  Alice’s  username  and 
password to continue with the assessment. 
2.  We  assume  that  Bob  is  registered  for  the 
COMP101 course. On the exam  day, Bob 
enters  his  username  and  password  to 
continue  the  assessment.  During  the  test, 
Bob takes a break (e.g. toilet) and exits the 
assessment  lab.  However,  Bob  does  not 
return to continue the test; instead Tom logs 
into the PC and resumes Bob’s test. 
The  above  scenarios  depict  an  e-assessment 
process, where the students are assumed trusted and 
the invigilator only monitors the events which occur 
in  the  examination  room.  Scenario  1  describes  a 
typical  case  of  impersonation,  where  a  student 
willingly  shares  his/her  identity  and  authentication 
details. Weippl [22] asserts that students who want to 
cheat willingly collaborate with the person who tries 
to impersonate as them. In contrast, people will not 
knowingly cooperate with someone who tries to steal 
their  money  out  of  their  bank  account  [22]. 
Therefore,  in  online  summative  assessments  a 
student  cannot  ‘accidentally’  impersonate  another; 
there  must  be  an  exchange  of  identity  and 
authentication details [21].  In scenario 2, a correctly 
authenticated  student  can  also  be  impersonated 
during the assessment.  The impersonator in scenario 
2,  is  only  required  to  posses  the  identity  and 
authentication  details  of  another  student  to  enable 
him resume the test. In scenario 1 and scenario 2 it is 
shown that the only requirement needed to write a 
test is a student’s identity and authentication details. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the machine will spot 
the difference between a legal and an illegal student; 
as  long  as  the  details  required  are  correct.  Hence, 
satisfying  the  identity  and  authentication  security 
goals may not be enough to ensure user security. 
5. Presence Security Goal  
In  this  section,  we  introduce  presence  as  an 
important  security  goal  of  an  online  summative 
assessment.  To  clarify  any  confusion  between  the 
identity  and  the  presence  of  a  student,  we  define 
these terms as used in this paper. Identity refers to a 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  an  entity  which 
differentiates  the  entity  from  other  entities  whilst, 
presence is a natural phenomenon which reflects a 
state of an entity being at a specific space or place. 
We  discuss  two  types  of  presence  specific  to  e-
assessment; the physical presence and the electronic 
presence. 
5.1. Physical Presence 
 
In summative e-assessment, the physical presence 
of a student  describes the ability  of the  student to 
occupy  space in a  given location  (e.g.  exam  hall).  
During  an  online  assessment,  an  invigilator  is 
required  to  check  the  students  ID  card  to  verify 
correct physical presence. Therefore, a photo on the 
student ID card is manually matched with the face 
represented.  The  student  will  proceed  with  the 
assessment if there is a close match between the face 
and  the  photo  presented.  Modifying  the  example 
described in section 4.1, we introduce an invigilator 
to manually verify the students’ presence before they 
can  enter  their  identity  and  authentication  details. 
This method is useful and it is a common approach 
to  prevent  impersonation  in  summative  e-
assessments  [20,  23].  Based  on  the  modified 
example, we again describe one scenario 1.  We assume that Alice is registered for the 
COMP101  course.  However,  on  the  exam 
day  Alicia  shows  up  to  represent  Alice. 
Alicia presents Alice’s student ID card and 
the  invigilator  confirms  that  her  face 
matches the photo on the ID.  
The above scenario depicts an online assessment 
process, where an invigilator confirms the students’ 
presence and monitors the events of the examination. 
In  the  scenario,  it  is  observed  that  an  incorrect 
student  (Alicia)  presents  a  correct  student  ID  card 
(Alice) and the incorrect student is allowed to write 
the  test.  We  suggest  two  possible  events  for  this 
occurrence 
•  An  invigilator  may  be  unable  to 
differentiate between lookalike students.  
•  An invigilator may have connived with the 
students to enforce the fraudulent act. This 
is connived impersonation.  
It  is  not  uncommon  to  find  lookalike  friends, 
family  members  or  identical  twins;  such  that  it  is 
difficult for an invigilator to spot the difference. If 
this occurs, then the impersonators will proceed to 
write the e-assessment undetected. The second event 
is a probability of connived impersonation which has 
often been overlooked in campus-based assessments. 
However,  it  is  important  to  prevent  any  form  of 
connived  impersonation;  as  the  impersonators  will 
surely proceed undetected. 
5.2. Electronic Presence 
 
In order to clarify the definitions of electronic and 
online presence, we firstly  describe the concept  of 
online  presence.  In  literature,  the  term  online 
presence  is  widely  employed  when  business 
transactions  are  conducted  via  the  internet.  Thus, 
these businesses are required to create and maintain a 
strong  online  presence,  to  have  an  impression  on 
potential  customers  [14].  Online  presence  is  also 
prominent  during  instant  messaging  and  visual 
representations known as avatars are used to depict 
online  persona.  There is  a blurry  line  between  the 
definitions  of  online  and  presence  and  electronic 
presence. However, we define electronic presence as 
a  state  in  which  a  students’  physical  presence  is 
electronically verified and monitored for the duration 
of an online assessment. We propose that, combining 
electronic  presence  with  the  identity  and 
authentication security  goals will improve the user 
security of summative e-assessments. Based on the 
examples described above, we revisit the scenarios  
1.  We assume that Alice is registered for the 
COMP101  course.  However,  on  the  exam 
day Alicia shows up to represent Alice. An 
electronic  presence  sensor  detects  Alicia’s 
presence and takes an image. When Alicia 
enters  Alice’s  identity  and  authentication 
details,  the  system  restricts  her  from 
proceeding with the assessment.  
2.  We  assume  that  Bob  is  registered  for  the 
COMP101  course.  During  the  test,  Bob 
takes a break; however, Bob does not return 
to continue the test. Tom returns to resume 
Bob’s test but the system restricts him from 
proceeding with the assessment.  
In the above scenario, Alicia is unaware that an 
image of her face is captured and matched against 
the  stored  identity  and  authentication  details. 
Unknown to Alicia, Alice’s stored image is tied to 
her identity and authentication details; thus, Alicia is 
restricted  due  to  image and  details  mismatch.  Bob 
could write the assessment, because the image taken 
initially  corresponds  to  his  identity  and 
authentication  details.  When  Tom  enters  Bob’s 
details,  an  image  is  captured  and  matched  to  the 
details typed. Tom is restricted, has the image do not 
match  the  information  (Bob’s  image  and  details) 
stored  for  the  initial  test  taker.    In  an  alternative 
method, a student’s electronic presence, identity and 
authentication  details  may  be  tied  to  a  static  IP 
address;  which  is  available  only  for  the  student.  
Furthermore, if electronic presence is verified then 
the chances of a lookalike family member or friend 
being  successful  in  impersonating  another  student 
will  be  very  low.  Similarly,  the  probability  of  a 
connived  impersonation  will  be  reduced,  as  the 
verification  of  presence  is  not  dependent  on  the 
invigilator. 
6. Conclusion and Future work  
This paper does not disregard the importance of 
confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  (C-I-A) 
security  goals  in e-assessment;  however  we  define 
security  goals  that  are  specific  to  summative  e-
assessments.  In this paper, we propose that a student 
taking  an  online  test  is  a  valuable  asset;  thus, 
presence,  identity  and  authentication  are  security 
goals which are expected of the student during an e-
assessment. It is shown that the existing identity and 
authentication  security  goals  are  susceptible  to 
impersonation threats, if the presence security goal is 
excluded. We divide the presence security goal into 
physical presence and electronic presence. However, 
we show that satisfying the physical presence goal is 
vulnerable  to  undetectable  lookalike  friends  and 
connived  impersonation  threats.  We  suggest  that, 
integrating the electronic presence with the existing 
identity  and  authentication  security  goals  will 
improve  user  security  in  summative  e-assessment 
systems. Our current work focuses on developing a formal 
model  of  an  online  summative  assessment  system 
which would satisfy the electronic presence security 
goal.  Firstly, we aim to model the behaviour of a 
system  with  the  identity  and  authentication  (I-A) 
security  goals  only.  Secondly,  we  will  model  the 
behaviour  of  a  similar  system  with  the  electronic 
presence security goal inclusive (P-I-A). Finally, our 
goal is to compare the two systems and determine the 
effect  of  electronic  presence  on  summative  e-
assessment security.  
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